Privacy at the browser level is hopeless! The answer is to compartmentalize. This VM and its convoluted Internet connectivity are pure Mirimir. I care not that the browser has been fingerprinted, that my IP has been logged, that evercookies have been placed, etc, etc, etc.
I have used Qubes, and I highly recommend it. But mostly I use VirtualBox in Debian. If you search my handle, you'll find how-to guides and articles. Basically, I use local networks of gateway VMs to route traffic through nested chains of VPNs, JonDonym and Tor. I mostly use pfSense VMs, because they're so easy to secure. But Whonix is the best solution for using Tor.
One could do the same in Qubes, more elegantly. And indeed, I got the idea of workspace and gateway VMs from Joanna Rutkowska's early posts about the Qubes project.
Check out the link in my profile. There are a couple background articles on risk assessment and anonymity systems, and a series of eight how-to guides. I also write a lot on Wilders, and have at times on Tor.SE.
I use various nested VPN chains, with three VPNs minimum. I also use a bunch of Whonix instances, connecting via VPN chains. And sometimes I play with JonDonym.
I've read some of your guides, and I don't really understand what the chained anonymity is getting you. Could you give some examples where complex chains are useful?
I can see limited circumstances where VPN/proxy->Tor, Tor->VPN/proxy, and VPN/proxy->Tor->VPN/proxy make sense, but no need for anything more complex than that.
