> users exchange data through encrypted transfers and the network setup ensures that the true sender of the file is always obfuscated
If this were really true in practice, the authorities shouldn't be able to see whether copyrighted content is transferred through your computer in theory (except by breaking the law themselves by putting surveillance software on your computer)... or am I missing something? (or do they have a "weaker" meaning for the term 'obsfucated'?)
Exit nodes are identifiable. The original source of that communication is not. The obfuscation is internal to the network, not on the border between networks.
This might be a stupid thing to ask but: if the sole purpose of RetroShare is p2p file sharing, why even have "exit nodes" at all? It's not like Tor when in the end you need an "exit" to the server you're trying to reach.
RetroShare has no exit-nodes. The whole story doesn't fit together.
On friend-2-friend-networks, only your friends see you. You have to actively add an user and their "public" key to exchange data with them, also if you only act as a relay-node. What has to have happened here is that either the pc was unlawfully hacked, or the user in question added a key from one of the public exchange boards, so he no longer only connected with his friends. Or one of his friends ratted him out.
The blogpost[1] taken by the article as source about some of the claims of the new danger for users talks about "Netzwerkmitschnitte", network logs. As the traffic between all parties is encrypted with keys only known to your trusted parties, that is impossible (apart from the possible mistakes above provoking this). At least as long as there is no crticial issue on the side of the Retroshare itself.
Furthermore, note two things: The court in Hamburg is known to be not in compliance with the german constitution. They repeatedly ruled against the law and in favor of media companies, or pro personal rights against the guaranteed freedom of speech. Furthermore, in this specific case the whole ruling is wrong, as it claims about "making the data available to the public", which is impossible in a friend-2-friend-network. Last, it is only a "Einstweilige Verfügung", which is not a full ruling, more like a first decision after a short fact check.
I guess the last hop before the receiver is meant. you cannot hide that. if the client downloads something, through many hops or not, the most recent one will always be the one that ultimately sends the requested data. and thus, even while it would be encrypted and the maintainer of said last hop has no idea what is transferred, he is the sender.
the law would need to acknowledge the hop's function as clueless service provider.
If this were really true in practice, the authorities shouldn't be able to see whether copyrighted content is transferred through your computer in theory (except by breaking the law themselves by putting surveillance software on your computer)... or am I missing something? (or do they have a "weaker" meaning for the term 'obsfucated'?)