> I doubt it, as D_A's target is stationary (and could be reduced to GPS coords) while D_B's target is moving.
It's a good point, though I should point out that GPS denial is assumed in those sort of contexts as a first countermeasure so D_A likely has alternative targeting, and that smaller drones can move faster with less energy storage, which itself requires less weight, compounding the benefits of being smaller.
D_A only needs to get to coordinates (X, Y) with a minimal requirements for Z as "some meters above ground." It doesn't matter if it gets there in 15 minutes or in 20 minutes, or in 2 hours.
D_B needs to absolutely nail X, Y, Z -- but also t!
To be at the time t0 at the point (X0, Y0, Z0), the defence drone needs to be at some other point (X1, Y1, Z1) at the time t1 -- given the speed and the direction of the attack drone. But what the defence drone has is just an estimation of these. The amount of back-propagation calculations for the defence drone is simply immense.
And also the attacker can send 100 drones without any real targeting at all and 10 proper expensive drones and you need to send up 110 defenders which need to be able to track flying drones. Being the attacker will always be easier.
He wasn't wrong in that claim: for the most part the bombers did get through, especially at night. The problem was that their effectiveness once "through" was far lower than the bombing proponents had claimed, due in particular to the lack of precision, but also the resilience of both targets and the enemy population.
I doubt it, as D_A's target is stationary (and could be reduced to GPS coords) while D_B's target is moving.