To be fair, this isn’t difficult. Voter rolls are public. We usually think of likely voters, but it’s also possible to identify likely non-voters.
But if someone is motivated enough by the scant risk-reward balance of fraudulently voting, they’re not going to be deterred by having to buy a fake ID.
> But if someone is motivated enough by the scant risk-reward balance of fraudulently voting, they’re not going to be deterred by having to buy a fake ID.
Buying a fake ID is orders of magnitude more difficult than looking up a name and using it when voting, isn't it?
And it's only a scant risk-reward balance if voting individually. If something organized and can send 10k-20k votes, that can tip plenty of elections IIRC.
> Buying a fake ID is orders of magnitude more difficult than looking up a name and using it when voting, isn't it?
I never bought a fake ID. But I knew people who did. It was an entirely on-the-phone transaction. Buying a fake ID in America is orders of magnitude easier than false voting.
> If something organized and can send 10k-20k votes
This is a legitimate concern. It is entirely unaddressed by voter ID requirements.
> To be fair, this isn’t difficult. Voter rolls are public. We usually think of likely voters, but it’s also possible to identify likely non-voters.
I agree, this is fairly easy to do. Signature checking will catch some of it, but the bar is a bit lower. The real problem making this work is detectability. Once someone legitimately tries to vote and gets told they already did, it's going to get noticed quickly.
And as you say, the value at an individual vote level is close to zero, which makes the risk/reward ratio pretty terrible.
To be fair, this isn’t difficult. Voter rolls are public. We usually think of likely voters, but it’s also possible to identify likely non-voters.
But if someone is motivated enough by the scant risk-reward balance of fraudulently voting, they’re not going to be deterred by having to buy a fake ID.