My point is that eliminating hallucinations is just a special case of alignment: the case where we want to bound the possible text outputs to be constrained by the truth (for a value of truth defined by $SOMEONE).
Other alignment issues have a problem statement that is effectively identical, but s/truth/morals/ or s/truth/politics/ or s/truth/safety/. It's all the same problem: how do we get probabilistic text to match our expectations of what should be outputted while still allowing it to be useful sometimes?
As for whether we should be solving alignment, I'm inclined to agree that we shouldn't, but by extension I'd apply that to hallucinations. Truth, like morality, is much harder to define than we instinctively think it is, and any effort to eliminate hallucinations will run up against the problem of how we define truth.
Other alignment issues have a problem statement that is effectively identical, but s/truth/morals/ or s/truth/politics/ or s/truth/safety/. It's all the same problem: how do we get probabilistic text to match our expectations of what should be outputted while still allowing it to be useful sometimes?
As for whether we should be solving alignment, I'm inclined to agree that we shouldn't, but by extension I'd apply that to hallucinations. Truth, like morality, is much harder to define than we instinctively think it is, and any effort to eliminate hallucinations will run up against the problem of how we define truth.