> It’s worth noting that Iran was a democracy until the 1953, when the US and UK supported a coup to install a corrupt dictator
This simply wasn't the case. I discuss this in a post below, but by the time Mossadegh was removed he had used a fraudulent plebiscite (claimed a 99.94% victory) to dissolve the parliament he had been feuding with and rule entirely by fiat. The Shah also wasn't installed by the U.S., he had been in power since Russia and the U.K. removed his father during WWII.
Here's an interesting letter written by the naval attache to Iran about the internal situation[1], written three months before the Shah's removal. It highlights the complexity of the situation - Mossadegh trying to use the Shah's political powers against parliament, the British interested in curtailing the power of the Shah in favor of the office of the prime minister with the hope that a pro-British prime minister will arise, U.S. opposition to this because they feel the Shah is the only thing thing holding the country together politically. And excerpt:
> Ardeshir is aware that Mossadegh is planning to try to force the Shah to sign a Firman to close the Majlis and is fearful that by some means he might come close to success in this. However, in the meantime, intense campaigning revealing Mossadegh’s plan is now being planned and will be evident in a day or two in the newspapers and in the Majlis. If Mossadegh ever attempts to close the Majlis without a Firman from the Shah, Ardeshir feels that this would be Mossadegh’s greatest mistake and with the present strength of the opposition would be almost, literally, fatal to him.
> He also mentioned that in the voting for “Speaker” of the Majlis the opposition papers are encouraging the present internal quarrelling within the National Front. At present a bitter struggle is being carried on between Shayegan, Moazami and Razavi to be the National Front candidate for Speaker; this could weaken the National Front considerably.
> Ardeshir stated that it is evident to most Iranian observers that the British aim in Iran is as follows: To officially agree that Mossadegh should go, but not to actively, covertly, work to this end, feeling that the strength of the opposition itself will work this out and that there remains a possibility that by a weak change in government the British might be able to control the next government. The number one aim of the British, however, is to weaken the Shah’s powers to intervene in time of crises to the point that at some time in the future when a pro-British Prime Minister appears the most can be made of it. He feels that in spite of the weak character of the Shah such a curtailment of powers would be disastrous to the country and would place the country at the mercy of whatever adventurers might temporarily be in position of political power, and that the country is not yet ready for this. In addition, the only symbol which holds the diverse elements of Iran together is the Shah himself.
The actual history of the period is fascinating. It's a shame that it keeps getting reduced to a sound bit that has little connection to reality.
This is a very white washed outlook on what happened. Would love to give a good reply when I have time. Suffice to say, this poster makes it seem like the US and UK were helpless and just stood by as things evolved in Iran. This is utterly insane.
> The Shah also wasn't installed by the U.S., he had been in power since Russia and the U.K. removed his father during WWII.
It's Disingenuous to frame it this way! He wasn't, but his father was installed and removed when needed so the son could take his place.
For the readers of this thread, if you are interested in how this went down, you can read this article [1] from "The National Security Archive" of GW University. There are references to the actual CIA documents that were declassified under "Freedom of Information Act".
This letter is from the people in charge of the coup. The same people wanted this information to remain hidden until they were forced to release it by law.
Also, this letter conveniently leaves out the part about the methods used by US-backed actors to 'persuade' those votes against Mossadegh in Majlis (Congress). The votes might not have been very "organic," as this declassified document [2] suggests.
Basically, when the U.S. saw opposition to Mossadegh growing they tried to organize and fund the opposition forces against him, while also lobbying the Shah to have him dismissed. The Shah was reluctant at first, but finally agreed as Mossadegh's efforts to gain political control progressed. The strategy the CIA envisioned failed, however (Mossadegh refused to step down when the Shah dismissed him and began arresting opposition). At this point the United States thought that Mossadegh would remain in power, but opposition groups inside Iran reorganized and removed Mossadegh.
I just read the Wikipedia link in the parent of this thread and it covers it in very interesting detail. Lots of moving parts, and I can’t give a synthesis. But this includes: nationalization of the oil fields that broke prior agreements with Britain (big money maker for Britain, but a bad deal for Iran), gradual move towards authoritarian leadership by Mosaddegh as his popularity waned due to economic hardship after a British oil embargo following the nationalization, Mosaddegh alignment with communists. Seems like there was both western meddling and also inherent power struggle happening in the country at that time. USA supported shah but who they should support was actually under debate. It states the USA coup attempt actually failed but may have precipitated the successful one, which was possibly natural. Finally, USA broke the British monopoly after the coup and Iran did get much more money from their oil after this.
I’m curious about GP’s reply. The nuance about the British wanting a PM they’d be able to sway is a piece I hadn’t heard before. Oil/nationalization of the Anglo Iranian Oil Company still seems like a key flashpoint in UK/US opposition regardless of what they considered doing instead.
This simply wasn't the case. I discuss this in a post below, but by the time Mossadegh was removed he had used a fraudulent plebiscite (claimed a 99.94% victory) to dissolve the parliament he had been feuding with and rule entirely by fiat. The Shah also wasn't installed by the U.S., he had been in power since Russia and the U.K. removed his father during WWII.
Here's an interesting letter written by the naval attache to Iran about the internal situation[1], written three months before the Shah's removal. It highlights the complexity of the situation - Mossadegh trying to use the Shah's political powers against parliament, the British interested in curtailing the power of the Shah in favor of the office of the prime minister with the hope that a pro-British prime minister will arise, U.S. opposition to this because they feel the Shah is the only thing thing holding the country together politically. And excerpt:
> Ardeshir is aware that Mossadegh is planning to try to force the Shah to sign a Firman to close the Majlis and is fearful that by some means he might come close to success in this. However, in the meantime, intense campaigning revealing Mossadegh’s plan is now being planned and will be evident in a day or two in the newspapers and in the Majlis. If Mossadegh ever attempts to close the Majlis without a Firman from the Shah, Ardeshir feels that this would be Mossadegh’s greatest mistake and with the present strength of the opposition would be almost, literally, fatal to him.
> He also mentioned that in the voting for “Speaker” of the Majlis the opposition papers are encouraging the present internal quarrelling within the National Front. At present a bitter struggle is being carried on between Shayegan, Moazami and Razavi to be the National Front candidate for Speaker; this could weaken the National Front considerably.
> Ardeshir stated that it is evident to most Iranian observers that the British aim in Iran is as follows: To officially agree that Mossadegh should go, but not to actively, covertly, work to this end, feeling that the strength of the opposition itself will work this out and that there remains a possibility that by a weak change in government the British might be able to control the next government. The number one aim of the British, however, is to weaken the Shah’s powers to intervene in time of crises to the point that at some time in the future when a pro-British Prime Minister appears the most can be made of it. He feels that in spite of the weak character of the Shah such a curtailment of powers would be disastrous to the country and would place the country at the mercy of whatever adventurers might temporarily be in position of political power, and that the country is not yet ready for this. In addition, the only symbol which holds the diverse elements of Iran together is the Shah himself.
The actual history of the period is fascinating. It's a shame that it keeps getting reduced to a sound bit that has little connection to reality.
[1] https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Ira...