I think one point the author is missing is that none of the dystopian use cases described really depend on a CBDC (in fact, China had a lot of similar things prior to its digital yuan launch). It would only make them marginally easier to implement (which might still be relevant in democratic countries).
Another thing that's missing is the fact that 'No more need for banks' has very wide implications. It would mean that banks can no longer do lending as they do now, they would have to essentially ask for permission from the central bank every time before they make a loan (that's because bank lending isn't based on 'fractional reserve banking', contrary to what most econ 101's teach [1]).
The subtitle suffix phrase "...totalitarian nightmare" isn't helpful. To a child parents are totalitarian nightmare by his reckoning. Except that parents are not out mess kids over. Institutional power in a sphere of work is not definitionally totalitarian. It how you use it. Let's not conflate choice in a matter with intent to harm.
A CBDC should probably have checks and balances anyway, because human factors sometimes drift into nonsense. For example, maybe there can be per-US-state account with different administrative rules. This cuts both ways.
The network of BC miners and users is still just people running code like the CBDC. Code can be changed. Forks can occur. People can decide other things then act on it. In fact it's worth reminding that non-CBDC have never had to deal with the full set of roles and responsibilities of a serious national currency in an international setting under war, pandemics, depressions, social welfare (payments from Congress) and major Wall Street failures. It's far, far from clear that BC would emerge running the same 1.0 version of BC on the same fork it seven years ago.
Once the initial setup is there (which isn't easy in either case), the difference is to write a new law that forces commercial banks to implement some changes vs one that forces the central bank to do so. The former currently have strong lobbies, that's what really makes it harder.
If societies still have cash and multiple banks, the power to order/stop/whatever is much less centralized, and there are multiple levels to resist it.
Another thing that's missing is the fact that 'No more need for banks' has very wide implications. It would mean that banks can no longer do lending as they do now, they would have to essentially ask for permission from the central bank every time before they make a loan (that's because bank lending isn't based on 'fractional reserve banking', contrary to what most econ 101's teach [1]).
[1] https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2019/12/20/Mon...