That isn't really true. It was brought down by stall prevention software that was using input from a single faulty sensor, and there was no way to override the inputs from this software. Further, there were multiple incidents before boeing admitted what was happening, even though in retrospect it looks like they knew what was happening all along.
My point was that it functioned in a manner vastly more similar to a conventional autopilot than what Airbus is proposing to do in this project.
MCAS was a simple algorithm that altered flight controls in a predetermined way upon a limited set of inputs. Airbus is proposing a vastly more ambitious solution that includes additional inputs from computer vision and a global view of the state of the aircraft.
If a relatively simple algorithm was not safe because of bad engineering decisions (or bad management incentives, whatever the case is) - then wouldn't a much more complex system be even more likely to have hard to discover corner cases and failures?
In this instance, the simplicity of the system was its down fall.
I think the use of human pilots complicates a system. You are relying on a component to the system that is susceptible to tiredness, distraction, threats, rage, revenge, self destruction, and sudden death. Complete automation would replace one extremely complex and unpredictable component, with a less complex and more predictable component.
I imagine full automation will come to air cargo first and gradually find its way in passenger liners as the public becomes less hysterical.