Germans (or at least Nazis) would, at the time, have considered it to be entirely worth it. I believe that the intended context was that the dignitary was a member of the same organization/country as the people trying to rescue him/her, while the enemy combatants would be from a group opposed to that country. Your response, on the other hand, seems to suppose the existence of a third party (the dignitary, enemy combatants, and in addition a group which dislikes the dignitary and knows that he's a horrible person).

Although you are correct that I am assuming a third party, it is only in the role of judging the described actions as just or unjust that a third party is assumed...namely the gentle reader - a necessary assumption in any discussion of hypothetical ethical scenarios as the example of the school children illustrates.

There is a convention to these things - one doesn't assume that the dead school children were carriers of an incurable virus and that only their death prevented a deadly pandemic etc.

As I am sure you recognize, a patriotic motivation does not make an action right - even if your assumption that the rescuers and rescued share political affiliation might often lead one to assume your holding such a belief.

De-ontological ethics are hierarchically ordered. If one must choose between a lesser and greater good, one must choose the greater good. But, that doesn't make the action ontologically right.

I.e. stealing qua stealing is always wrong, but it is right to steal to feed a starving family, if stealing is necessary. However, stealing is still wrong.

>"it is right to steal to feed a starving family, if stealing is necessary"

This slips into what I called "semi-deontological" ethics which has the same issues as ontological ethics, i.e. that it is possible to provide a counter example for any generic ethical rule. Until you get down to an actual example one may invoke Nazi's, fatal pandemics, or lawyers tied to railroad tracks.