CT logs are designed to be able to handle queries from all web browsers on a daily / more frequent basis, and the output from queries is easily cacheable (and the logs can be mirrored in a read-only manner).
If FF is already doing any log inclusion proofs for certificates, then I think including one more (for the FF release itself) would be pretty much line noise.
I think an interesting question arises as to how well with the CT logs themselves would scale to handle the same kinds of certificates for all binaries, if this ends up taking off as a good idea in general. They've had to handle quite an explosion in X509 certificates over the past year or two due to Let's Encrypt. Some of Google's logs now show more than 80,000,000 certificates [0] in there - IIRC 2 years ago it was a low single digit million.
If FF is already doing any log inclusion proofs for certificates, then I think including one more (for the FF release itself) would be pretty much line noise.
I think an interesting question arises as to how well with the CT logs themselves would scale to handle the same kinds of certificates for all binaries, if this ends up taking off as a good idea in general. They've had to handle quite an explosion in X509 certificates over the past year or two due to Let's Encrypt. Some of Google's logs now show more than 80,000,000 certificates [0] in there - IIRC 2 years ago it was a low single digit million.
[0] https://crt.sh/monitored-logs