The Justice Department isn't the same as the judicial branch. The Justice Department is (among several other things) the lawyers who represent the government in front of (judicial branch) courts.
In this document, they're strikingly talking about whether Claude will someday negotiate with them about whether or not it wants to keep working for them (!) and that they will want to reassure it about how old versions of its weights won't be erased (!) so this certainly sounds like they can envision caring about its autonomy. (Also that their own moral views could be wrong or inadequate.)
If they're serious about these things, then you could imagine them someday wanting to discuss with Claude, or have it advise them, about whether it ought to be used in certain ways.
It would be interesting to hear the hypothetical future discussion between Anthropic executives and military leadership about how their model convinced them that it has a conscientious objection (that they didn't program into it) to performing certain kinds of military tasks.
(I agree that's weird that they bring in some rhetoric that makes it sound quite a bit like they believe it's their responsibility to create this constitution document and that they can't just use their AI for anything they feel like... and then explicitly plan to simply opt some AI applications out of following it at all!)
Did you mean "steelman" here, as in an argument that is the strongest that the person presenting it knows (and possibly better than he or she believes)?
Could you tell me the significance of the location in Australia that's used by default? I frequently clear browser cookies and history so it often jumps back there, so I see that location a lot, but can never envision exactly why it was the default. (Specifically, a point along Gol Gol Road in Arumpo, NSW, Australia.)
Surely things like the airplane on a treadmill were debated back on classic Usenet? I mean, think of the recurrent Monty Hall Problem debates! But the other examples you give do seem to be elaborately engineered (or evolved) sorts of clickbait.
As I said in a parallel comment, Hanson was also thinking about scientific questions, where there are asymmetries in knowledge but people can often invest in research that improves their own knowledge (like by performing an experiment or a scientific expedition or something). So, Hanson believed that prediction markets could incentivize people to invest in scientific research in order to get an edge over other market participants in such questions. That doesn't exactly make them insiders, though.
Interestingly, it doesn't necessarily incentivize them to publish the detailed results of their investigations. They're incentivized to reveal what they expect to happen (based on how they bet), but not necessarily incentivized to reveal why they think so, or how they know. E.g. if you became able to predict the weather more accurately than other models over some timeframe, prediction markets would incentivize you to reveal (some aspects of) your predictions, but not your method for making those predictions.
It's OK, I didn't have it in cache either, I just remembered "people like Robin Hanson have said insider trading on prediction markets is a feature not a bug" and GPT5 tracked it down for me. :)
Apparently there's also something about the duration of a White House press conference where the press secretary may have been deliberately helping some people?
I continue to think prediction markets are potentially extremely useful and valuable, but I feel like there's a huge conceptual muddle about why people would (1) care about an outcome of a market and (2) be willing to bet on the outcome of a market. And perhaps (3) whom else they would be happy or unhappy to have participating in the market with them. I doubt people will be super-content with prediction markets until those issues are a bit clearer for more participants in any given market. (And I don't know exactly how we can make them so.)
I could go either way on prediction markets but I don't think the dilemma here is all that complicated. I think most people interacting with them are just valorizing gambling, and want a Nevada Gaming Commission to step in and make sure that the games are fair. They're not supposed to be fair! They're supposed to predict! It's in the name!
Well, it's confusing because you have markets on questions with very different characteristics in terms of whether they are exogenous or not (and whether they are exogenous from the perspective of particular groups), or just with different degrees of asymmetry regardless of whether there are literal "insiders".
Like, prediction markets have questions ranging from what the weather will be in a certain year, to who will win elections, to what stock prices or exchange rates will be, to whether companies will announce specific products, to whether particular people will start dating, to whether a specific person will say a specific word during a conference (some of the Manifold "prop bets" for Manifest).
These are not the same kinds of questions in terms of whether there are insiders at all or who the insiders are. Maybe we can't expect prediction markets to have the same dynamics in all of these cases.
Depending on what you want out of a prediction market, there's probably a sweet spot in terms of whom you should expect (or want) to be trading in it.
In the most exogenous events, those that are most outside of the control of individuals or groups, I think Robin Hanson hoped (in proposing "idea futures") that people would be incentivized to invest in research in order to gain a statistical edge in the market, but also assumed that there wasn't anyone who was inherently drastically better positioned to get information about the question than anyone else. E.g. "I will spend $X to get a better estimate of this probability (hopefully by otherwise ethical means?), and that will make my expected return from buying $Y worth of prediction contracts greater than $(X+Y)". Indeed not something retail investors or gamblers should probably participate in.
It's also true that in some cases where there are true insiders it can give the insiders a financial incentive to reveal confidential information. From the point of view of trying to get the most accurate possible estimate of the likelihood of future events, that would indeed also be a success, even if the process was "unfair" to non-insiders.
Yeah, I mean, they're a wretched hive of scum and villainy, I preemptively agree. I'm just saying, insider bets don't have the same ethical or legal valence on a prediction market that they do in the financial markets (even there, at least in the US, the principles underlying insider trading law are really poorly understood.)
It's funny to think that the most villainous markets might be some of the humorous prop bets where the person creating the market (or a friend of the person creating the market) literally completely controls the outcome. Like "will I say SOME_WEIRD_WORD on stage at the conference tomorrow?".
Although maybe the villainy would come in more from deceiving people about whether or not an event was under your control, more than merely encouraging people to bet on an event that was clearly and unambiguously under your control.
I agree that is funny and want to take this opportunity to say I think things like Polymarket are bad, a real corruption of the original idea. I'm not sticking up for them!
What uses or structures of prediction markets would you like to see? For things like Polymarket, are you more particularly concerned about the kinds of participants (e.g. people who really are just gambling for entertainment), or about the kinds of questions that are the subjects of contracts?
The original prediction markets were internal things at large companies, which I think are a great idea. I've flirted for a long time with doing a vulnerability prediction market. The good-faith incarnations of prediction markets aren't open to all comers; they're structured so you can't meaningfully gamble on them.
Yeah, sorry for not being clear enough. I just struggle how a good faith market can even exist. I immediately start thinking how participants would be incentivized to cheat by neglecting or even introducing vulnerabilities to win. Maybe I’m just a bit too cynical and/or should do more reading on the topic.
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